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Abstract
The problem of computing a common point that lies in the intersec-
tion of a finite number of closed convex sets, each known to one agent in a
network, is studied. This issue, known as the distributed convex feasibil-
ity problem or the distributed constrained consensus problem, constitutes
an important research goal mainly due to the large number of possible
applications. In this work, this issue is treated from a game theoretic
viewpoint. In particular, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative
game for which a potential function exists and prove that all Nash equilib-
ria of this game correspond to consensus states. Based upon this analysis,
a best-response based distributed algorithm that solves the constrained
consensus problem is developed. Furthermore, one more approach to solve
the convex feasibility problem is studied based upon a projected gradi-
ent type algorithm that seeks the maximum of the considered potential
function. A condition for the convergence of this scheme is derived and
an exact distributed algorithm is given. Finally, simulation results for
a source localization problem are given, that validate the theoretical re-
sults and demonstrate the applicability and performance of the derived
algorithms.
1 Introduction
Recent technological advancements, mainly in the fields of electronics and wire-
less communications, have enabled the development of various networks of
miniaturized devices that surround us in our everyday lives. Examples of
such networks include wireless sensor networks (WSNs)[1], multi-agent systems
(MAS) [2], machine-to-machine networks (M2M) [3] or Internet-of-Things (IoT)
[4]. They serve a multitude of scopes and applications for example in smart-
cities [5], the industry [6], the smart energy grid [7], and in vehicular networks
[8].
The expanding use of ad-hoc networks of small-scale devices along the con-
tinuous improvement of their computational and storage capabilities, drive the
demand for efficient distributed algorithms that are able to confront more and
more complex problems that arise in this setting [2], [9], [10]. Distributed opti-
mization based problems such as parameter estimation [11], [12], decision mak-
ing / detection [13] and learning [14], [15] have been studied by many researchers
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and various efficient algorithms have been developed. Such algorithms alleviate
the need for transmitting all the measurements obtained by the devices to a cen-
tral computer for further processing and, in many cases, they enjoy no loss in
performance as compared to centralized approaches. Furthermore, distributed
algorithms are in general resilient to several types of device or network failures,
they are scalable in the sense that minor or no modifications are required when
the network is altered or expanded, and they do not suffer from the “single point
of failure” problem, which is inherent in centralized architectures [16].
The problem of convex feasibility has a central role in applied mathematics.
In can be formulated in various ways, such as finding a common point of closed
and convex sets, finding a common fixed-point of nonexpansive operators, find-
ing a common minimum of convex functionals or solving a system of variational
inequalities [17]. Likewise, the problem has found numerous and diverse appli-
cations, in particular in solving inverse image reconstruction problems [17], [18],
in image restoration [19] but also in source localization [20] and node/network
positioning problems [21], [22] and in distributed dictionary learning [23]. On
the other hand, various centralized optimization algorithms have been studied
for the solution of convex feasibility problems. Two very important works on
the topic are [24] and [25]. In [26], the authors provide a review of various
algorithms with an attempt to unify and generalize them. Notable research
has also been done towards the derivation of convergence rate results for these
algorithms [27], [28]. Also, note that the well known Gerchberg-Saxton image
reconstruction algorithm [29] can be seen as a POCS method where only two
convex sets are employed. More recently, an algorithm of the Newton-type has
been proposed for the solution of the convex feasibility problem [30]. In general,
the most popular method for solving the convex feasibility problem consists in
the successive projection onto each of the convex sets, following a fixed periodic
ordering or, at least, one in which each set is utilized at least once in a fixed
number of iterations (Browders Admissible Control law, [25]). In the following,
we will use the name Projections Onto Convex Sets (POCS) to refer to the
scheme that performs a sequence of projections while utilizing a finite number
of closed convex sets in a periodic fashion.
While several centralized algorithms for the convex feasibility problem have
appeared and their convergence and convergence rate behavior has been stud-
ied, literature on distributed algorithms for the convex feasibility problem is
rather limited. In particular, there are only two works that develop and study
such distributed algorithms, [31] and [32]. In [31], the authors make a connec-
tion between problems that arise in cooperative control and potential games.
In contrast to that work, we specialize the considered scenario by considering
convex constraint sets. Furthermore, our work considers continuous sets, i.e.,
non-countable infinite possible strategies for each player. Also, while the work in
[31] focuses on games with suboptimal Nash equilibria, in the game considered
here we prove that the considered game has no Nash equilibria other than those
that correspond to consensus states for the network. In [32], the authors develop
consensus and optimization algorithms for multi-agent networks. Although the
work is very general, encompassing even time varying communication graphs,
the derived algorithms rely upon properly selected combination weights that are
not easy to select. In contrast to that work, we do not consider time-varying
communication graphs, and derive algorithms with explicitly given combination
weights which are easier to implement. Also, different from [32], the algorithms
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proposed in this work are derived by following a game theoretic viewpoint.
The main contribution of this work is that it derives two easily imple-
mentable, yet provably convergent, algorithms for the solution of the distributed
convex feasibility problem. Furthermore, this work offers a game-theoretic view-
point to this classical mathematical problem. The proposed algorithms posses
different properties. For example, the first of the proposed algorithms does not
require the tuning of any additional parameters / combination weights for its
operation. However, it does not allow the simultaneous strategy update of all
the nodes, but rather it employs a mechanism to identify the nodes that can
update their strategies at each iteration. On the other hand, the second al-
gorithm allows all nodes to simultaneously update their strategies, however it
relies upon the selection of a learning rate scalar parameter common for all the
agents in the network, that must be properly adjusted.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the problem
formulation is given. In Section 3, the considered problem is modelled as a
non-cooperative game in strategic form and a best-response based distributed
algorithm is developed. In Section 4, a gradient ascend based algorithm is
proposed and a sufficient condition for its convergence is given. Finally, Section
5 presents various simulation results to demonstrate the performance of the
derived algorithms and Section 6 concludes this work.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a set of agents/nodes N = {1, 2, . . . , N} that are able to commu-
nicate as described by some time invariant, connected and undirected graph
G = (N , E), where the set of edges E contains pairs of nodes that can com-
municate directly. Each node n ∈ N is able to communicate directly with a
subset of nodes Nn ⊂ N , which are termed neighbours of node n, while n /∈ Nn.
Consider also that each node n ∈ N has a closed convex set Cn ⊂ IR
q. The
information that such sets represent may vary with the application considered,
as an example, they could represent the node’s constraints/knowledge regarding
some parameter vector po ∈ IR
q that the network is interested to estimate, in
the sense that the measurements of node n imply that po ∈ Cn. Assuming that
the intersection I of all such sets is non-empty, i.e.,
I =
N⋂
n=1
Cn 6= ∅ , (1)
the scope is to make all nodes agree (consent) on a common vector pˆo ∈ I, that
combines the knowledge of all the agents in the network and constitutes the
estimate of the network for the unknown true parameter vector po. Furthermore,
the computation of such a vector pˆo ∈ I must be performed in a distributed
fashion, in the sense that only (limited) local information exchange is possible
among the nodes.
3 Game-Theoretic Analysis
In this section, starting from the modeling in [31], we formulate the distributed
constrained consensus problem defined in Section 2 as a non-cooperative game
3
in strategic form [33]. In the sequel, we demonstrate that an exact potential
function exists for the considered game [34]. Furthermore, we provide a proof
that the considered game has no Nash equilibria other than those that cor-
respond to consensus states for the network. Finally, a distributed algorithm
based on best-response dynamics is derived that is guaranteed to converge to
such a consensus state.
3.1 Game definition
Consider a game, where the set of players is the set of nodes N , the convex set
Cn ⊂ IR
q constitutes the so-called action set of node n and each point pn ∈ Cn
is an action or strategy for player n. It is convenient to also define the Cartesian
product set C = C1×C2×· · · CN that contains all possible selections of strategies,
one for each player, i.e., all possible strategy profiles [33]. Considering a strategy
profile p ∈ C, we also denote as p−n the strategies of all nodes except n and
write p = (pn,p−n). In order to model the considered consensus problem as a
game, each player is assigned a so-called utility function Un : C → IR, that we
define to be
Un(p) = Un(pn,p−n) = −
∑
k∈Nn
‖pn − pk‖
2, p ∈ C . (2)
It is clear that the considered utility functions promote the agreement among the
nodes, since a greater utility is given when neighbouring nodes select strategies
close to each other. Also, it is easy to see that in the case of consensus, all
nodes reach their maximum utility, which is equal to zero. Furthermore, when
all nodes get zero utility then a consensus has been reached among the nodes
of the network since the communication graph G is assumed to be connected.
3.2 Analysis of the considered game
In this subsection we analyse the properties of the game defined in Subsection
3.1. We start by characterising the utility functions in equation (2).
Lemma 1: The utility functions
Un(p) = −
∑
k∈Nn
‖pn − pk‖
2, p ∈ C , (3)
are smooth and concave, or equivalently, −Un(p) are smooth, convex functions
defined over the convex set C.
Proof: Consider the function fn(p) = ‖pn‖
2, where pn is a sub-vector of p.
Clearly, fn(p) is convex in pn, since it is simply the square Euclidean norm of
pn. Also, it is unaffected by the variables (elements) of p not included in pn,
thus it is constant (affine) for these variables, and in total, it is convex in p.
Consider now the function gnk(p) = ‖pn−pk‖
2. Clearly, gnk(p) is convex, since
it results from the composition of fn with an affine mapping [35]. Also, −Un(p)
is convex as the sum of convex functions gnk(p) = ‖pn − pk‖
2, for k ∈ Nn.
Furthermore, the gradient of the utility function
∇nUn(p) = −2
∑
k∈Nn
(pn − pk) , (4)
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exists for all p ∈ C, thus Un(p) is a smooth function. Of course, the domain C
is a convex set, since it is the Cartesian product of convex sets [35].
Consider now the function φ : C → IR, defined as
φ(p) = −
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈Nn
1
2
‖pn − pk‖
2, p ∈ C . (5)
Corollary 1: From Lemma 1, we have that −φ(p) is a smooth, convex function
defined over the convex set C.
As shown in the following, it can be proven that the function in (5) con-
stitutes a so-called exact potential function for the game defined in Subsection
3.1. An exact potential function [34] associated with a non-cooperative game,
is a function with the property that whenever any single player changes their
strategy and thus changes their utility function, the potential function changes
by the exact same amount. Thus, games for which an upper bounded poten-
tial function exists (i.e., potential games), have the interesting property that
any sequence of selfish, greedy steps, in which all players participate while one
player at a time increases their utility function, will converge to a so-called
Nash equilibrium of the game, in which no player has an incentive to change
their strategy unilaterally. This point corresponds to a so-called Pareto optimal
point of the potential function. In the following lemma, we provide a somewhat
more general proof that (5) is a potential function for the considered game.
Lemma 2: Consider any fixed set of nodes K ⊂ N that are not directly con-
nected to each other in G. Assume that all nodes in K update their strategies
while all other nodes keep their strategies unaltered, so that the strategy profile
is modified from p(1) to p(2). Then,
φ(p(2))− φ(p(1)) =
∑
n∈K
(
Un(p
(2))− Un(p
(1))
)
. (6)
Proof: We can write the function in (5) using two terms, where the first one
depends on the strategies of the nodes n ∈ K while the second term does not
depend on these strategies, as
φ(p) =
= −
∑
n∈K
∑
k∈Nn
‖pn − pk‖
2 −
∑
n∈N\K
∑
k∈Nn\K
‖pn − pk‖
2
2
=
∑
n∈K
Un(p)−
∑
n∈N\K
∑
k∈Nn\K
‖pn − pk‖
2
2
(7)
The second term in (7) does not depend on the strategies that change, thus, it
has the same value for p(1) and p(2). Based upon this observation, we can write
that
φ(p(2))− φ(p(1)) =
∑
n∈K
(
Un(p
(2))− Un(p
(1))
)
, (8)
which concludes our proof.
Corollary 2: Using Lemma 2 it is easy to note that, as a special case, when
K = {n}, we have the proof that φ(p) is an exact potential function for the
considered game.
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Theorem 1: The game defined in Subsection 3.1 has no Nash equilibria other
than those that correspond to consensus states.
Proof: Consider that the strategy profile pa is a Nash equilibrium that does
not correspond to consensus, thus
φ(pa) < 0 . (9)
Denoting as pa,n the strategy of node n in pa and given that pa is a Nash
equilibrium, then, no player is able to increase their utility by changing their
strategy unilaterally. Since the utility functions are smooth, consider that node
n employs the constant step size version of the gradient projection algorithm
[16] to increase their utility. We have assumed that a Nash equilibrium has
been reached, thus the gradient projection algorithm at each node n should
have reached a limit point in the sense that for some suitable1 s > 0 we would
have
pa,n = PCn
(
pa,n + s∇nUn(pa)
)
, (10)
where PCn(·) denotes the projection operator onto the set Cn and ∇n denotes
the gradient vector at the entries of pa,n. Following the definitions for the utility
and potential functions, it can be verified that
∇nUn(pa) = ∇nφ(pa) = −2
∑
k∈Nn
(pa,n − pa,k) . (11)
Thus, equation (10) can be written as
pa,n = PCn
(
pa,n + s∇nφ(pa)
)
. (12)
Finally, since projecting onto each of the convex sets Cn is equivalent to the
projection onto the Cartesian product set C (See [36], Example E.10.2.0.3), the
equations in (12) for each n can be summarized into one, independent of n, as
pa = PC (pa + s∇φ(pa)) . (13)
Equation (13) can be recognised as the constant step size version of the gradient
projection algorithm for the maximization of the potential function, and equa-
tion (13) suggests also that pa is a limit point. Thus, it implies that pa is a local
maximum of the potential function φ(p). However, since the potential function
is concave and its maximum is equal to zero (at the consensus points), it cannot
have any local maxima with φ(pa) < 0. Thus, we arrive to a contradiction,
meaning that the considered game cannot have any Nash equilibria other than
those that correspond to consensus states.
Corollary 3: From Theorem 1, it is easy to verify that any (distributed) al-
gorithm that computes Nash equilibria for the game defined in Subsection 3.1
will converge to a consensus state, thus solving the (distributed) constrained
consensus problem.
In the following, we propose a distributed algorithm for computing Nash
equilibria for the game defined in Subsection 3.1 that is based upon best-
response dynamics. Furthermore, the algorithm takes advantage of Lemma 2 to
allow the simultaneous update of the strategies of nodes that are not directly
connected to each other in G. As it will be seen, only local messages are required
by the proposed algorithm for reaching a consensus state.
1It is easy to verify that any s given by Lemma 4 can be considered.
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3.3 Algorithm development
Let us consider the sub-problem of updating the strategy of one node, say n,
given that the other nodes of the network (at least, the neighbours of node n)
do not alter their strategies. We are interested in computing the best possible
strategy for node n, defined as the one that maximizes their utility function,
an approach known as best response. Computing the best possible strategy for
player n given that the other players of the network have selected their strategies
according to the strategy profile p(t) at some discrete time instant t, amounts
to solving the following optimization problem
p(t+1)n = arg max
p
n
∈Cn
(
Un(pn,p
(t)
−n)
)
= arg max
p
n
∈Cn
(
−
∑
k∈Nn
‖pn − p
(t)
k ‖
2
)
. (14)
This optimization problem employs a smooth, concave cost function and a con-
vex constraint. Thus, some suitable convex optimization method could be used
for its solution. However, in the following we directly give the optimal solution.
Lemma 3: The optimal solution of problem (14) is given by
p(t+1)n = PCn
(
1
|Nn|
∑
k∈Nn
p
(t)
k
)
. (15)
Proof: We first consider the unconstrained problem. The optimal solution for
the unconstrained problem is a point in IRq that minimizes the sum of square
distances from a set of given points p
(t)
k , k ∈ Nn. It can be easily verified (by
setting the gradient of the function being optimized equal to zero) that the
solution to this, unconstrained, problem is given simply as the centroid of these
points
c(t)n =
1
|Nn|
∑
k∈Nn
p
(t)
k . (16)
We now turn our attention to the constraint in (14). After some algebra, we
have that
Un(pn,p
(t)
−n) = −|Nn|
∥∥∥pn − c(t)n ∥∥∥2 + C (17)
where
C = |Nn| (c
(t)
n )
Tc(t)n −
∑
k∈Nn
(p
(t)
k )
Tp
(t)
k (18)
is constant. Thus, we can see from (17) that the utility function changes its
value according to ‖pn − c
(t)
n ‖2, which means that it is symmetric around c
(t)
n ,
that is, the utility function has a constant value at all points with equal distance
from c
(t)
n . In other words, the level-sets of the utility function are hyper-spheres
centered at c
(t)
n . This property suggests that the point in the set Cn that is the
closest one to the centroid c
(t)
n will be the optimal solution for the constrained
problem in (14). This closest point is given as the projection of c
(t)
n onto the
convex set Cn.
In light of Lemma 3, a possible algorithm for the solution of the (distributed)
constrained consensus problem would be to utilize equation (15) and follow a
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fixed periodic ordering for the nodes or, at least, one in which each node updates
their strategy at least once in a fixed number of iterations as in [25]. Clearly, such
an approach requires some prior organization of the network and hinders the
fully distributed implementation of the algorithm. Furthermore, by following
such an approach only one node would update their strategy at each iteration
and could lead to very slow convergence especially for large-scale networks.
To alleviate these concerns, we can exploit Lemma 2 to allow for the simul-
taneous updates of strategies of nodes that are not directly connected in G. In
Table 1 we present the proposed distributed algorithm followed by each node
n for the solution of the distributed constrained consensus problem. The algo-
rithm utilizes a mechanism to select the nodes that update their strategies at
each discrete time instant t. In particular, all nodes compute the length of the
update that they can obtain
m(t)n =
∥∥∥r(t)n − p(t−1)n ∥∥∥2 , (19)
where r
(t)
n denotes the updated strategy of node n according to (15), send this
metric to all their neighbours and follow the (greedy) rule that only the node
with the greater value for this metric in their neighbourhood will actually per-
form the update. In the case of a tie, the node with the highest id wins. We
refer to this algorithm as the Distributed Game Theoretic Consensus (DGTC)
Algorithm.
4 Gradient Ascend on the Potential Function
In the previous section we developed a distributed algorithm for the constrained
consensus problem by following a game-theoretic optimization methodology. As
we saw, that method required some mechanism to ensure that neighboring nodes
do not update their strategies simultaneously. Although the developed mech-
anism required only minimal and local interactions, in this section we study
another approach that fully alleviates the need for such a mechanism. In par-
ticular, we propose a gradient ascend algorithm that seeks the global maximum
of the potential function where all nodes can update their estimates at the same
time. Interestingly, the studied approach results into an algorithm very similar
to the one studied in [32]. Furthermore, we provide a novel condition for the
convergence of this approach when using a constant step-size. In the following,
we first derive the algorithm in a centralized setting and then we show that it
can be implemented, exactly, in a distributed scenario.
4.1 Centralized approach
In this subsection we derive an algorithm for seeking the global maximum of
the potential function in (5). Since the maximum of the potential function
corresponds to consensus states for the network, its maximization will mean
the solution of the constrained consensus problem. The considered problem is
equivalent to the minimization of the cost function
J(p) = −φ(p) =
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈Nn
1
2
‖pn − pk‖
2
, p ∈ C . (20)
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Input: Convex set Cn, Set of Neighbours Nn, Iterations T
Output: Final point p
(T )
n
1. Compute an initial point p
(0)
n ∈ Cn
2. for t = 1 to T
3. Send p
(t−1)
n to neighbouring nodes in Nn
4. Receive p
(t−1)
k from neighbours k ∈ Nn
5. Compute
r
(t)
n = PCn
(
1
|Nn|
∑
k∈Nn
p
(t)
k
)
6. Compute the metric
m
(t)
n =
∥∥∥r(t)n − p(t−1)n ∥∥∥2
7. Send m
(t)
n to neighbouring nodes in Nn
8. Receive m
(t)
k from neighbours k ∈ Nn
9. if m
(t)
n > maxk(m
(t)
k )
10. p
(t)
n = r
(t)
n
11. elseif m
(t)
n = maxk(m
(t)
k ) and n > argmaxk∈Nn(m
(t)
k )
12. p
(t)
n = r
(t)
n
12. else
13. p
(t)
n = p
(t−1)
n
14. end if
15. end for
Table 1: Distributed Game Theoretic Consensus Algorithm at node n
According to Corollary 1, J(p) is a smooth, convex function defined over the
convex set C. Thus, the gradient projection algorithm [16] can be used to
optimize (20) and compute its global minimum. Employing the constant step
size version of the gradient projection algorithm yields the update equation
p(t+1) = PC
(
p(t) − s · ∇J(p(t))
)
, (21)
where p(t) denotes the vector of all node strategies at iteration t and s is the
constant step size. The gradient of (20) is given by
∇J(p(t)) =
[
∇1J(p
(t))T · · ·∇NJ(p
(t))T
]T
, (22)
where
∇nJ(p
(t)) = 2
∑
k∈Nn
(p(t)n − p
(t)
k ) . (23)
Finally, the required step size s can be selected via the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Every limit point of {p(t)} generated by the gradient projection
algorithm in (21) with
0 < s <
1
2
√
q
∑N
n=1 |Nn|
2
(24)
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is stationary.
Proof: Consider any two strategy profiles x ∈ IRN ·q and y ∈ IRN ·q and denote
their elements using two indexes, i and j, where xij denotes the j-th element of
the strategy of agent i, where i = 1, 2, . . . , N and j = 1, 2, . . . , q, and similarly
for yij . Also, define
δij = xij − yij . (25)
Using these definitions, we have that
‖x− y‖2 =
N∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
δ2ij ≥ max
l,m
(|δlm|
2) . (26)
On the other hand, we have that
‖∇J(x) − ∇J(y)‖2 =
N∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
4
(∑
k∈Ni
(δij − δkj)
)2
≤
N∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
4
(∑
k∈Ni
(|δij |+ |δkj |)
)2
≤
N∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
4
(∑
k∈Ni
2max
l,m
(|δlm|)
)2
=
N∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
16|Ni|
2max
l,m
(|δlm|
2)
=
N∑
i=1
16q|Ni|
2max
l,m
(|δlm|
2)
≤
N∑
i=1
16q|Ni|
2 ‖x− y‖2 (27)
Thus, we have that
‖∇J(x) −∇J(y)‖ ≤ L ‖x− y‖ , (28)
with
L = 4
√√√√q N∑
i=1
|Ni|2 . (29)
Finally, using Proposition 2.3.2 from [16], we have that every limit point of
{p(t)} generated by (21) using
0 < s <
2
L
=
1
2
√
q
∑N
i=1 |Ni|
2
, (30)
is stationary.
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Input: Convex set Cn, Set of Neighbours Nn, Step size s, Iterations T
Output: Final point p
(T )
n
1. Compute an initial point p
(0)
n ∈ Cn
2. For t = 1 to T
3. Send p
(t−1)
n to neighbouring nodes in Nn
4. Receive p
(t−1)
k from neighbours k ∈ Nn
5. Update
6. p
(t)
n = PCn
(
p
(t−1)
n − 2s
∑
k∈Nn
(
p
(t−1)
n − p
(t−1)
k
))
7. End for
Table 2: Distributed gradient projection consensus algorithm at node n
4.2 Distributed approach
The gradient projection algorithm, described by equation (21) in the previous,
was developed without considering distributed implementation. However, it is
quite clear to see that an exact distributed implementation is possible. First, if
we define for simplicity of notation
u(t)n = p
(t)
n − 2s
∑
k∈Nn
(p(t)n − p
(t)
k ) , (31)
then, the vector in the projection operator in (21) will be given by
p(t) − s · ∇J(p(t)) =


u
(t)
1
...
u
(t)
N

 , (32)
where each part u
(t)
n can be computed locally at node n if neighbouring nodes
send their strategies p
(t)
k , k ∈ Nn to node n. Secondly, the projection operator
onto the Cartesian product set C is equivalent to projections onto each of the
constituent convex sets Cn (See [36], Example E.10.2.0.3), as shown by
PC




u
(t)
1
...
u
(t)
N



 =


PC1(u
(t)
1 )
...
PCN (u
(t)
N )

 . (33)
Equations (31), (32) and (33) demonstrate that, in fact, the algorithm of
equation (21) can be exactly implemented by the individual nodes of the net-
work. Thus, given that the considered cost function is smooth and convex,
the centralized gradient projection algorithm is known to converge to a global
minimum point of the cost function, and since the distributed implementation
is identical to the centralized one, it will have the same convergence proper-
ties. The overall distributed approach, referred to as the distributed gradient
projection consensus algorithm, is summarized in Table 2.
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5 Numerical results
In order to validate the theoretical results derived in the previous and to study
the relative convergence rate of the considered algorithms under various scenar-
ios, some simulation results were conducted.
5.1 Validation of convergence results
In the first considered simulation our scope is to validate the convergence of the
consensus algorithms. To this end, a network of N = 100 nodes is simulated
where each node is uniformly placed in the q-dimensional unit box at locations
ln, n = 1, . . . , N and direct communication is possible when the distance be-
tween two nodes is less or equal to a parameter ρ. The nodes of the network
cooperate in a source localization problem. In particular, a source is uniformly
placed at location z in the central q-dimensional box with side length equal to
0.5. The convex set of node n is defined as the hyper-sphere centered at the
location of node n with radius equal to the node-source distance plus some small
positive constant, i.e.,
Cn = {l ∈ IR
q : ‖ln − l‖ ≤ ‖ln − z‖+ ǫ} , (34)
where ǫ = 0.01 is used to ensure that the source is located inside Cn. For the
gradient projection consensus algorithm we use a step size close to the maximum
allowed according to Lemma 4, and in particular we set
s = 0.99
1
2
√
q
∑N
i=1 |Ni|
2
. (35)
Also, we perform Monte-Carlo simulation of 50 different network instances and
keep only instances of the localization problem that resulted into a connected
network topology G. For comparison, the centralized POCS scheme is included
in the results where we perform 40 circles of projections with a fixed node
ordering.
In the following we consider a “consensus metric” c(t) that measures how
close to each other the estimates of the nodes are and we define it as
c(t) =
√√√√ N∑
n=1
q∑
j=1
∣∣∣p(t)n,j − µ(t)j ∣∣∣2 , (36)
where
µ
(t)
j =
1
N
N∑
n=1
p
(t)
n,j , (37)
and p
(t)
n,j denotes the j-th component of the estimate at node n at time t.
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the evolution of the consensus metric as a
function of iterations for q = 2 and q = 3, respectively. In both cases the com-
munication range was ρ = 0.3. It is evident from these plots that consensus
is always reached, and the consensus metric reaches a value close to machine
precision. The difference in steady-state values is due to the different numerical
properties of the considered algorithms. Also, it appears that the the devel-
oped game theoretic consensus algorithm converges faster than the considered
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Figure 1: Consensus metric as a function of iterations in q = 2 dimensions,
communication range ρ = 0.3
gradient projection algorithm, in these scenarios. In order to better study the
convergence rate behavior of the considered algorithms further numerical results
are presented in the sequel.
5.2 Convergence rate comparisons
In this section, the convergence rate of the considered algorithms is evaluated
as a function of the network edge density. In more detail, the localization prob-
lem considered in the previous is repeated here, but 1000 network realizations
are simulated that each corresponds to a different network topology and edge
density. The edge density of the network is varied by using a different communi-
cation range in each realization. We measure the edge density of the network in
terms of the so-called Fiedler eigenvalue [37], where smaller values correspond
to more sparsely connected networks. For evaluating the rate of convergence,
the number of iterations required so that the consensus metric drops below 10−5
is measured, for each algorithm.
Fig. 3 corresponds to a two dimensional (q = 2) setting, where the commu-
nication range ρ was uniformly varied in the interval [0.1, 0.4]. Similarly, Fig.
4 corresponds to a four dimensional setting, where the communication range
was uniformly varied in the interval [0.4, 0.7]. These figures demonstrate that
the distributed game theoretic consensus algorithm (Table 1) converges faster
than the distributed gradient projection consensus algorithm (Table 2), when
the network topology is sparse enough, i.e. when the Fiedler eigenvalue of the
network is smaller than 3 in the two dimensional case and when the Fiedler
eigenvalue of the network is smaller than 7 in the four dimensional case. In
more densely connected networks, the distributed gradient projection consen-
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Figure 2: Consensus metric as a function of iterations in q = 3 dimensions,
communication range ρ = 0.3
sus algorithm that utilizes the step size given by equation (35) was found to
converge faster.
6 Conclusions
In this work, the problem of computing a common point that lies in the inter-
section of a finite number of closed convex sets, each known to one agent in
a network, was studied by following a game-theoretic approach. The problem
was formulated as a non-cooperative game for which a potential function exists
and it was proven that all Nash equilibria of this game correspond to consensus
states. Following this result, a best-response based algorithm for distributed
constrained consensus was derived. Furthermore, a projected gradient type al-
gorithm was also considered. Finally, simulation results were given to validate
the convergence of the studied schemes and to explore the relative convergence
rates. The novel game-theoretic algorithm was shown to be particularly useful
for consensus problems in sparsely connected networks.
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